The WTO as an institution was set up 'to help trade flow as freely as possible,' thus ensuring smooth passage towards economic globalization but, unfortunately, this has not been the case. The provisions and instrumentality of WTO have been used to scuttle the independence of developing nation-states and disempowering them economically.
M aterial reproduction of the means of subsistence and their distribution and redistribution among different communities and countries is arguably one of the most important activities of a country. Rules of trade are the product of the recognition of this vital human need -the need to share, sell, and supply material goods among individual members of the community and extend them to the members of international community. But, more often than not, this process of transaction is riddled with chaos, conflict, and contradiction at times even leading to wars. In the context of its divergence and dominance, it would be naïve to call trade in general and international trade in particular a mere economic activity. In fact, there are social, cultural, and political dimensions determining the course and consequences of trade relations. Trade is essentially dependent on socio-political and cultural climate; state patronage, cultural acceptance, and social norms determine the quantum and quality of trade relations and hence they constitute primary analytical categories. In fact, the essential elements of trade, viz., capital, contract, and labour are quintessentially products of this relationship though depending upon the context, the dependent-dominant relationship among them alters their positions. This article focuses on the analysis of the concept of labour standards in the contemporary global trade in the context of World Trade Organization (WTO).
WTO: EMERGENCE AND ENCAPSULATION
The birth of the WTO on the first day of the year 1995 was definitely a new beginning for the world in terms of trade, tariff, and territorial expansion of commerce though controversies about its role and rules continue to surround it even today, nearly after a decade of its existence. The creation of WTO for managing the world system of trade did not bring many surprises in the sense that the framework was already in place before its actual appearance and its trading system was at least half a century old if not more. Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) had provided the rules for the system. (The second WTO ministerial meeting, held in Geneva in May 1998, included a celebration of the 50th anniversary of the system.)
The WTO's creation on January 1, 1995 marked the beginning of the biggest reform of international trade since the Second World War. It also brought to reality the failed attempt to create an international trade organization in 1948. Much of the history of those 47 years was written in Geneva. It was a journey that spanned the continents, from that hesitant start in 1948 in Havana (Cuba) via Annecy (France), Torquay (UK), Tokyo (Japan), Punta del Este (Uruguay), Montreal (Canada), Brussels (Belgium), and finally to Marrakesh (Morocco) in 1994. During that period, the trading system came under GATT, salvaged from the aborted attempt to create the ITO. GATT helped establish a strong and prosperous multilateral trading system that became more and more liberal through several rounds of trade negotiations. But, by the 1980s, the system needed a thorough overhaul. This led to the Uruguay Round and ultimately to the WTO.
From 1948 to 1994, the GATT provided the rules for much of the world trade and presided over periods that saw some of the highest growth rates in international commerce. It seemed well established, but throughout those 47 years, it was a provisional agreement and organization. For almost half a century, the GATT's basic legal principles remained much as they were in 1948. There were additions in the form of a section on development added in the 1960s and plurilateral agreements (i.e., with voluntary membership) in the 1970s, besides continuation of the efforts to reduce tariffs. Much of this was achieved through a series of multilateral negotiations known as trade rounds -the biggest leaps forward in international trade liberalization have come through these rounds which were held under the aegis of GATT.
In the early years, the GATT trade rounds concentrated on further reducing the tariffs. Then, the Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties brought about a GATT AntiDumping Agreement and a section on development. The Tokyo Round, during the seventies, was the first major attempt to tackle trade barriers that did not take the form of tariffs and to improve the system. The eighth, the Uruguay Round of 1986-94, was the last and the most extensive of all. It led to the birth of WTO with a new set of agreements.
WTO exists as an institution dedicated "to help trade flow as freely as possible -so long as there are no undesirable side-effects." This purpose is fulfilled through a number of means which include: removing obstacles to trade, serving as a forum for negotiations, and settling disputes through a neutral, rules-based procedure. WTO improved on the prior GATT system by providing a dispute resolution process -consisting of dispute panels and a central Appellate Body -which brings finality to disputes that arise over interpretation of the organization's trade liberalization agreements. It is thought that this finality will give the trading rules more strength thereby allowing trade to be freed more quickly and equitably. The overarching goal that emerges through the freeing of trade is to create predictability and certainty such that producers, importers, and exporters can conduct their businesses in a more efficient manner. It is based also on the notion that freer trade leads to each country filling an economic niche that it is most suited to occupy. It follows that the resulting efficiency gains spur economic growth, which is good for all participants involved, including both rich and poor countries. In pursuing these goals, the WTO has made special recognition of the needs of the developing countries, and has kept central the "view to raising standards of living ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income."
LABOUR STANDARDS
This brings us to the issue of labour standards and the debate surrounding them. Thus far, international labour standards have been considered to be within the domain of the International Labour Organization (ILO), an organization set up with the objective to oversee labour relations. These standards are considered to be the basic and fundamental minimum that the workers should be provided with. There is no direct link between the ILOstandards and trade. The standards are codified in the Declaration on Fundamental Labour Rights passed by ILO members in June 1998 (PrNewswire, 1998) . The Declaration equates ILO membership with accession to the Declaration's provision of mandatory core labour rights standards. The core labour rights include:
• freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining • elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour • effective abolition of child labour • elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation all of which are derived from conventions predating the Declaration.
'Exigencies of Entanglement
The conflict that has arisen with regard to these core standards is with regard to certain developed countries demanding greater enforcement for them. These countries advocate for a linkage between trade and labour standards for absolute enforcement of the core standards and thus call for the inclusion of labour standards in the WTO agreement. This linkage is strongly opposed by the developing world and certain developed countries which argue that this is merely an attempt by the developed North to protect its markets and disturb the advantageous labour scenario for the undeveloped South. The feeling of insecurity and distrust among the developing and developed nations or the North-South divide seems to have a historical background and an extension of colonial past where the underdeveloped South was constantly under siege. The brutalities of the past experiences and subsequent feeling of bitterness have only exacerbated the schism. Availability of cheap labour and indigenous craft are two factors which allow some leverage to the poor countries clubbed in the developing world to survive the onslaught of a competitive global market. Standardization of labour in the name of human rights and creating a level playing field without looking into the compensation and context will only jeopardize the future trade in these countries.
The issue of trade and labour standards has been with the WTO since its inception. At the Ministerial Conference of the GATT held in Marrakesh in April 1994 to sign the treaty that formed the WTO, nearly all ministers expressed a point of view on the issue. The Chairman of that conference concluded that there was no consensus among member governments at the time and thus no basis for agreement on the issue. At the first WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in December 1996, the issue was taken up and addressed in the Ministerial Declaration. The Ministers stated:
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO) is the competent body to set and deal with these standards and we affirm our support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour standards for protectionist purposes and agree that the comparative advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will continue their existing collaboration.
At the third Ministerial Meeting in Seattle in De-
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cember 1999, the issue of core labour standards was perhaps the most divisive issue on the agenda. In the run-up to the meeting, both the United States and the European Union put forward proposals for addressing the issue of labour standards in the WTO. Although, officials from both members said they did not envision the use of trade sanctions in the context of the labour standards issue, both proposals were fiercely opposed by the governments of developing countries. At the conference itself, the US, EU, and other developed country governments fought to get the issue addressed in a working group and succeeded. Debate in that group was intense and there was strong disagreement among members. On his way to the conference, former US President, Bill Clinton, told a Seattle newspaper that he believed that trade sanctions might one day be used in retaliation for labour-standard violations. When the story appeared the next day, the impact on the conference was substantial. The developing country delegates hardened their resolve and although there was serious debate on how the issue may be discussed inside an international framework, consensus on a role for the WTO on the question of labour standards was not attained.
Since the Seattle Ministerial Conference, governments from around the world have turned their attention to the ILO as the forum for addressing this question. During the June 2001 meeting of the ILO governing body, the Working Party on the Social Dimension of Globalization had reached several agreements on how it might proceed with its work. It was agreed informally that the technical capabilities of the Working Party needed to be addressed and that issues for further discussion needed to be decided in advance. There was a general agreement that trade liberalization and employment and investment, with special emphasis on poverty reduction, should be the main issues taken up by the Working Party. To make the Doha Ministerial Declaration succeed, the developed countries were more careful in addressing the issue. As a result, labour standards were not integrated into the Doha Declaration.
The Doha Declaration has one striking paragraph, which says… "We recognize that under WTO rules, no country should be prevented from taking measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, or of the environment at the levels it considers appropriate, subject to the requirement that they are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade and are otherwise in accordance with the provisions of the WTO Agreements.."a rephrased version of Adam Smith's legendary statement of the butcher, baker et al. There are a number of arguments cited both in favour of this linkage and others against it. The next section will deal with the arguments given in support of having such a linkage between trade and labour standards.
Strands of Ethics and Economics
Advocates of this nexus, mainly developed countries of the North, give arguments on two entirely different planes. One argument being on a moral plane -i.e., this linkage is necessary as it would ensure enforcement of higher standards of work for the labour force of the developing nations -gives them a larger piece of the pie. The advocates of this view argue that this viewpoint is necessary in this age as these core values have now attained a fundamental status in the world community or, in other words, have become the basic minimum that has to be assured by the world community at large. Some advocates go to the extent of arguing that these bare minimum standards represented by the core standards have attained the status of jus cogens (Zaheer, 2003) .
The other argument hinges on a purely commercial basis, that being given the lower labour standards followed by the developing South, the labour force available is relatively cheaper. This results in the cutting down of production cost which results in the cheaper goods of the developing countries having greater demand in the global marketplace. This, in turn, results in what the North terms as an 'unfair trade advantage' to the 'South.' (Stern and Terrell) . This, in the long run, not only results in a trade deficit but also in phenomena like the loss of factory jobs for Western workers to 'sweatshops' in the East. Another recent 'evil' produced by the same for the Western economy -outsourcing -can claim parenthood from the phenomenon of unfair labour standards according to this school of thought. This has raised concerns about there being a resultant 'race to the bottom' which would result in the erosion of labour standards in developing nations as well forced by a need to compete and unemployment.
The main argument against leaving labour standards solely under the aegis of the ILO is the evident lack of serious enforcement mechanism available with it. Half-baked measures on the part of ILO, it is argued, would not have any effect on the violators in the developing world. It is only when tough and economically destructive measures like trade sanctions are imposed that any significant change in this regard would be brought about. This argument certainly has certain elements of realism as it acknowledges the importance of tough economic sanctions for the imposition of desirable social change on a global scale. This argument has prompted many to advocate for the inclusion of certain minimum environmental standards into the WTO ambit as well.
The bare minimum nature of these core standards and their universal recognition within all legal systems is another aspect which is highlighted by the Western advocates. The argument goes that since most developing countries have already legislated laws enforcing these basic standards, they should not be averse to the enforcement of the same. An opposition of such an imposition would be against the basic principles of jurisprudence and betray unwillingness on the part of the lawmakers to give serious effect to their own promulgations. This brings us to the question of whether structural and legal foundations of WTO permit such an inclusion of labour standards. The WTO scholar, Robert Howse's (1999) proposal to establish the public morality exception of Article XX(a) of the GATT as the legal basis to enforce core labour standards is a leading theory for the creation of such jurisdiction (Howse, 1999) . The meaning of 'public moral' in this context needs to be examined not only in the regime of international law but also from common parlance of human sensitivity that allows a minimum degree of duty of care and compassion necessary for a meaningful survival of less privileged population.
The Howse proposal attempts to reach labour rights standards through an organic extension of Article XX beyond its current range of application. The credibility of the proposal relies on an anticipated interpretation of 'public morality' contained in subsection (a) of the article (Moorman, 2001) . GATT Article XX carves out a set of public interest exceptions to, inter alia, Article I most-favoured-nation and Article III national treatment principles. As Howse (1999) writes, "Article XX(a), which permits otherwise GATT-inconsistent measures 'necessary to protect public morals,' might be invoked to justify trade sanctions against products that involve the use of child labour or the denial of workers' basic [core] rights." (Howse, 1999) Like other exceptions, the public morality exception is subject to the chapeau (the Article XX preamble), which prohibits the implementation or design of measures falling within the exception in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner (Howse, 1999) . Therefore, where Article XX(a) is the means of implementation, a contracting state may take action in response to and in retaliation for a violation of core labour standards by another contracting state. Should the alleged violating state challenge the responsive measure through the Dispute Resolution Unit, the defending contracting state may attempt to demonstrate the legality of the response-measure using Article XX(a).
Currently, no precedence exists in the Panel or Appellate Body reports for Article XX(a) claims or defenses because the provision has never been invoked by a disputant in either body. Consequently, it is not certain that the term 'public morals' was originally intended to reach human rights concerns relating to labour conditions. Thus, in accordance with the WTO precedence, "the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides procedures for interpretation of treaties," (Charnovitz, 1989) . Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." In the absence of direct authority, a WTO Panel or the Appellate Body would follow the instructions for treaty interpretation as described in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention.
GATT drafters did not define 'public morals.' After a review of the textual meaning, context, and subsequent legislative history relating to the public morality exception, neither the ordinary definition of 'morals' nor the context in which the term appears resolves the ambiguity with respect to the specific behaviour of the individuals or class of individuals the term was meant to reach (Charnovitz, 1989) . In the face of continued ambiguity, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention directs the interpreter to consider the travaux preparatoires. This inquiry seeks to determine how the drafters at the time of the agreement's preparation would have interpreted the language in question. In contemporaneous agreements as well as in those pre-dating the GATT, 'public morals' contemplated not only the more obvious concerns of temperance and sexual morality, but also humanitarian interests. Charnovitz (1989) cites approximately 35 legal documents that pre-dated the 1947 Article XX(a) and defined the meaning of public morals as commonly employed and accepted in international commerce or trade related agreements.
Apart from this textual and rather narrow meaning of the WTO mandate with regard to labour standards, there exists the argument that the WTO should incorporate labour standards because labour is a factor of production, and failure by a government to regulate the means by which labour is utilized constitutes a trade distortion. In its efforts to promote free trade and create efficiency gains, the WTO seeks to decrease trade distortions. Often used in agricultural agreements, the term 'distortion' in the trade context is used to signify the notion that "prices are higher or lower than normal... than the levels that would usually exist in a competitive market." A typical example of distortion is government subsidies to farmers to support domestic production. Farmers enjoying government subsidies are more competitive than unsubsidized farmers even though the latter group would be more competitive on a level playing field. Such a situation is economically inefficient.
However, a direct subsidy is not the only type of distortion we can imagine. Government inaction may also create a type of indirect subsidy that is distortional. For example, let us compare two different situations. Country A decides to subsidize its textile industry by giving free grants of $ 1million each year per factory per company. In contrast, Country B decides to repeal a health regulation on textile factories by raising the maximum internal temperature allowed from 75 (degrees) F to 90 (degrees) F, saving producers $ 1million per factory per year in air-conditioning costs. Each of these actions is functionally equivalent for textile producersin each situation they are better off by $ 1 million. Yet, to the government and to the WTO, the two situations are quite different. For the government, shedding (or refusing to pass) labour regulations costs nothing and actually may save money -making it a much more attractive way to lure foreign investment or to grow domestic industry (Ann Elliot, 2000) . For the WTO, the direct subsidy would be targeted for gradual elimination as a trade distortion whereas the regulatory change would be seen as a legitimate part of comparative advantage.
In order to decide whether this regulatory subsidy * is a distortion, we must determine whether it alters prices that would usually exist in a competitive market. That, in turn, depends on how we view competition. If we view perfect competition as that which exists in a pre-governmental state of nature, then the regulatory subsidy would seem non-distorting. However, under this definition of perfect competition, we would also have to view theft by force and slavery as similar forms of legitimate competition not within the cognizance of the WTO. If this was the case, then WTO members would be helpless to ban stolen and slave-made goods upon import. This result is not required. The WTO Appellate Body has endorsed the proposition that the GATT "is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law." Clearly, then, there must be some distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of governmental neglect in domestic economic policy that WTO members can consider without violating the rules-based system. We may debate whether to look at international law or other common norms to discern the nature of this distinction, but for present purposes, we need only acknowledge that such a distinction exists. Therefore, it is stated that a valid link between trade and labour within the scope of WTO regulation manifests two qualities: (1) an effect on production costs; and (2) a moral or legal notion of illegitimate competition (Zaheer, 2003) .
Cacophony of Contestation
The major problem lies with the contradictory arguments given in favour of the labour standards. The advocates of labour standards initiate with the moralethical arguments but their real motive gets revealed when these ethically-based arguments are supported with economic arguments. If humanitarian concerns relating to the labour standards are really genuine, then citizens of rich countries can make income transfers to workers in poor countries. It is reasonable to presume that, with higher incomes, the supply price of their labour would increase and to restore labour market equilibrium, labour standards would have to rise (Srinivasan, 1998 ). The issue of child labour in developing nations can be solved by this money transfer to the parents as such transfers relax the resource constraints. But, this solution of money transfer is not possible. The issues of the plight of the labourers and toiling masses of the third world are not moral-ethical but core economic issues. It is not unthinkable that a country threatened with trade sanctions for failure to raise its labour standards would not respond by raising them but instead choose to forego gains from trade. Again, if some country, for whatever reason, is unable to raise the labour standards to the minimum prescribed limit, departure from the free trade would be the only viable option left to raise the labour standards in that country. This would further deteriorate the economic status of that nation with no possibility to raise the labour standards (Stern and Terrell) . The approach to imposing sanctions had been condemned by the Ex-Director General of WTO, Michael Moore: "Imposing trade sanctions -making developing countries even poorer -will not stop children being put to work. Or lift the living standards of their families. Just the opposite. Poverty, not trade, is the main cause of unacceptable working conditions and environmental degradation. And the answer to poverty is more trade and business, not less." Hence, the ethical purpose of incorporating non-tariff barrier of labour standards would be as ineffective as the ILO conventions.
Jan Tinbergan, a Nobel prize recipient for Economics, has stated that, in general, there must be at least as many policy instruments as there are objectives and that in achieving any objective, the policy instrument that has the most direct impact on the objective will be most likely, though not always, to do so at the least social cost. His principles are applicable to the creation of the agencies that set the rules governing international economic transactions and specification of their mandates (Srinivasan, 1998) . Thus, the ILO is the most appropriate agency to deal with the specific and special issues relating to the labour standards. Loading one specialized institution with matters that fall within the purview of another, such as including a social clause in the mandate of WTO rather than leaving labour standards within the purview of the ILO, is not conducive to addressing them effectively. Further, ILO has not yet reached a political consensus of its constituents to identify clearly a core group of conventions or minimum standards and ILO's supervisory mechanism was not designed to apply sanctions of any kind following non-compliance. In fact, the ILO specifically had expressed itself against attempts to use its labour standards as a protectionist strategy (Stern and Terrell) . Moreover, the issues of labour welfare and proper working conditions at workplaces have closer nexus with the socio-economic rights and they could only be realized progressively in the third world countries. The fact that developing nations have recognized the minimum standards of ILO in their national legislations and are striving for it is a clear indicator of their bona fide intentions. By imposing those standards by means of WTO clearly indicates interference with the sovereignty. Further, it also opens a route to enforce other issues which are distinctly related to the international trade and hence totally violating the most basic principle of equality of states in international law.
The recognition of impact of labour standards on the welfare of workers and on the costs of production means that there should be uniformity of such standards across all the trading nations. But, if labour standards are uniform throughout the globe, then any issue of mobility of labourers is clearly out of question especially in the case of unskilled labour. Moreover, instead of relying on the indirect means through linkage which depend upon the desired response by the developing countries for its success, the citizens of the developed countries could adopt a more effective direct means of preparing their own government to lift any restrictions on the immigration of workers from countries with poor labour standards. The workers migrating to the places having better labour standards would be benefited and this is supported by the moral-philosophical idea of freedom of movement of humans across artificial political boundaries, propounded by John Rawls. Furthermore, as the native population of developed countries would start ageing and the average level of training and education goes higher, these economies would face an increasing scarcity of less-skilled labour (Economiquity, 2003) . Further, any argument related with the loss of employment opportunity of the labourers in the developed nations by way of outsourcing is basically a temporary political issue in those nations and against the evidentiary suggestions (Muralidharan,1999 (Muralidharan, , 2004 . Moreover, this issue is just a way of negotiation in the WTO as one can see that United States has asked India to open up its agricultural sector in response to the outsourcing of jobs.
It is also important to note that labour standards is essentially a protectionist argument (Krishnaswami, 1999) to ensure the survival of many of the inefficient and non-viable industries like leather and textile in the western countries. Another dimension of the problem is related to a completely different set of arguments advocated by the strong industries of the West for the dilution of existing labour laws that protect the interests of workers, for instance, laws on minimum wages, job security against lay-offs and closures, the right for better working conditions, compensation in case of injuries, provident funds, and trade union rights (Dasgupta, 1999) . This is more in line with the orthodox view on liberalization which, by its very nature, is anti-trade union and MNC-investment-centred. These industries argue that the existing labour laws do not allow flexibility in the operation of an enterprise, that is, they do not allow wages to fall or the workers to be sacked, as and when needed, in order to balance demand with supply (Dasgupta, 1999) . Hence, the issue of labour standards is not even ethically favoured for the welfare of the labourers of the third world.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, it can be said that world economics should never be seen in separation from world politics. In these halcyon days of political shenanigans, strange things are happening, viz., the leaders of capitalism are espousing the virtues of labour standards, front-ranking socialists in the developing world are chanting the mantra of free trade, and the Marxian superstructure has a new base. In this unipolar world with just one military superpower, the multi-polar world of economic power is bound to be disturbed. It is the superstructure of political power that is serving as the determinant of the economic base. Ironically, it is for the supporters of free trade and minimal state intervention that this serves as the biggest blow. There can be no freedom when Uncle Sam has the final say.
In this scenario, one can ask whether there is any way out and whether there is any hope for the WTO, given the unilateral approach adopted by the EU and the US in this regard. All such acts display a clear lack of faith and trust in the organization. An extremely important aspect of this conflict, which seems to be avoided by the developed nations, is the linkage between labour standards and poverty. The same has to be acknowledged immediately.
The developing countries, on the other hand, have to acknowledge that a deferred linkage has to be created between labour standards and trade in order to have realistic possibility of a strict compliance of these standards. After all, one has to admit that it is the industrial elite in these countries who have the most to gain from any linkage and they will try to use their clout to prevent any change in the condition of labour through any other means. A deferred linkage would have a lineage after a pre-decided prescribed future date (e.g., in the case of compliance with TRIPS), with special deferential provisions for lesser developing countries.
An unbiased and realistic mechanism would have to be developed in order to determine an alleged violation of these standards. There should also be a holistic compliance with all the agreements previously agreed, and finally, there should be a compliance with the spirit of free trade, which forms the core of the WTO agreement.
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LAW, LABOUR, AND LEGITIMACY
The crowning fortune of a man is to be born to some pursuit which finds him employment and happiness, whether it be to make baskets, or broadswords, or canals, or statues, or songs.
Ralph Waldo Emerson
